We investigate the economic consequences of stock ranking using a novel natural experiment in which stock ranking is due to the rounding of stock prices. The results show that ranking a stock in a more salient place can increase its return volatility, trading volume, liquidity, and cause higher short-term stock returns and an eventual reversal. Ranking only matters when it affects investor attention. The ranking effect is stronger when more stocks are on the list. Further, small investors are more affected by ranking. Overall, the evidence shows that uninformed ranking can cause correlated investor trading and have significant economic consequences.
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Introduction
Ranking is everywhere: dishes on restaurant menus, candidates on ballots, job market candidates in recruiting systems, business schools on U.S. News and Financial Times, stocks on stock exchange websites, and investment products available in our retirement plans. Some rankings are informative but others are random. Ranking is clearly important if ranking contains information. However, prior research finds that even random ranking can have important economic consequences.
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To distinguish the information effect and the pure ranking effect, we exploit a novel natural experiment in which ranking is due to the rounding of prices: the price limit events on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). These two exchanges restrict the daily absolute movement of a stock price to 10% of the previous trading day's closing price for most of their listed stocks. The minimum tick size for stocks is RMB one cent. Therefore, in cases where a 10% price change is not an integral number of cents, the daily price limit is rounded to the nearest cent. This rounding leads to differences in the maximum and minimum movements of the daily returns. For example, the maximum daily price change for stocks priced at 9.99RMB, 10.00RMB, and 10.01RMB is 1.00RMB. But they translate into different maximum and minimum return limits of ±10.01%, ±10.00%, and ±9.99%, respectively.
2 Very often stocks are ranked based on their daily returns. In the example, 10.01% will be ranked the first in a best-performing stock list and -10.01% will be ranked the first in a worst-performing stock list.
These rankings are available to many investors. In our sample period, many Chinese investors trade using computer software packages. All of the widely used software packages allow 2 investors to rank stocks by their daily returns. Ranking is the easiest way to get the list of daily best (and worst) performing stocks. Figure 1 is a screenshot from a widely used trading software platform. 3 This platform shows the first page of the summary information on all of the Chinese listed stocks ranked in descending order by their daily returns. The first 29 stocks hit the 10% limit and the last two do not. 4 The worst-performing stocks are on the last page but investors can rank stocks in ascending order and list them on the first page. Second, a stock that has hit its daily price limit is very often featured on social media such as investment-related television programs, finance websites, and investor forums. Investors pay attention to these media channels to get information.
In many cases, the social media ranks stocks in the same way as Figure 1 . Third, in the earlier part of the sample period when computers were not widely used, many investors would visit their brokerage houses to submit orders. The brokerage houses often displayed return-ranked stock lists on their electronic boards. If ranking affects investor trading and stock prices, we expect that stocks ranked differently might perform differently beyond what can be explained by rounding per se.
Given a day, we compare stocks that are ranked higher on the list (denoted as the High group) to stocks ranked lower on the list (denoted as the Low group), for each type of price limit events separately. Empirically, we do not see any significant difference between the High and Low groups before they hit the limit.
For stocks that hit the 10% upper price limit, the High and Low groups start to show significant differences after they hit the limit. Relative to the Low group, stocks in the High group have significantly higher trading volume, better liquidity, and higher return volatility. We also find 3 In China, winning stocks are indicated in red and losing stocks are indicated in green. This is different from most other countries where the opposite convention is typically used. 4 On the screenshot, returns are also rounded with only two digits after the decimal point. However, the ranking is based on un-rounded raw returns. For example, the first two stocks' raw returns are 10.0186% and 10.0178%, respectively. In case of ties of raw returns (almost always when returns are exactly 10%), stocks are ranked by their stock code (in descending order for the 10% stocks and in ascending order for the -10% stocks).
3 that the High groups' returns on t+1 (the first day after they hit the price limit) are significantly higher than the Low group, and the difference reverses in two weeks. The economic magnitudes are large. On t+1, relative to the Low group, the trading volume of the High group increases by more than 19.3% of its normal time level, return volatility increases by more than 23.0% of its normal time level, and the abnormal return of the High group is around 38.1 basis points higher.
However, we do not find any significant ranking effect among the -10% lower limit stocks.
These findings are consistent with an investor attention-based interpretation. Stocks ranked higher in the upper price limit list attract more attention that leads to crowded buying (Barber and Odean, 2008) . The asymmetry between the two types of limit events can be explained by the asymmetry between buying and selling. Consider a stock which receives positive (negative) public news, and the news increases (decreases) its equity value by 12%. In a world without any friction or ranking, under the price limit rule, the price of this stock should increase (decrease) by 10% today and open tomorrow up (down) by another 2%. After that, prices should be flat if there is no additional news. Therefore, stocks that hit the upper (lower) price limit are more likely to attract buyers (sellers). While investors can buy any stock they want, due to short-sales constraints, they generally only sell the stocks that they own. We expect that ranking is less important for selling:
sellers are more likely to pay attention to their holdings than to the ranking of all stocks, and the number of stocks they hold is typically small. Limited attention has a smaller effect on selling decisions than buying decisions. 5 We conduct four more tests to provide support for the attention-based interpretation. First, 5 The finding that ranking does not matter for the -10% limit stocks is seemingly inconsistent with Barber and Odean (2008) who document that individual investors are net buyers after both extreme positive and extreme negative returns. The difference in our settings explains the difference in our results. The price of stocks hitting the ±10% limit typically continues in the same direction. Therefore, the -10% limit stocks mainly attract sellers. In Barber and Odean (2008) , returns do not persist as in the price limit cases, and therefore stocks experienced extremely negative returns can also attract potential buyers. 4 we expect that ranking only matters if it affects investor attention. Number one on a list might attract more attention than number ten, but it is unlikely that number 101 attracts more attention than number 110. There are a group of "special treatment" stocks (typically called ST stocks) that have daily limits of ±5%. The ±5% returns are not extreme enough and are typically ranked in the middle of return-based rankings. We find no ranking effect for these stocks. Second, using a direct measure of attention, we find that ranking affects attention only for the 10% upper limit events, not for the -10% lower limit events or the ±5% events. Third, the effects of ranking are stronger when more stocks hit the 10% limit in a day. Fourth, we find that the ranking of the 10% upper limit stocks has larger effects on small investors who are more likely to have limited attention.
We also find that stocks ranked higher on the 10% upper limit list have lower price efficiency than stocks ranked lower. On the one hand, investors try to allocate their limited attention optimally. On the other hand, they are affected by the salient attributes of options and attention allocation can lead to suboptimal choices. The attention difference across stocks that hit the price limit is unlikely to be a deliberate decision by investors. This is consistent with the argument by Barber and Odean (2008) and our finding that the attention grabbing events mainly attract less sophisticated investors. This suggests that distinguishing how investors allocate their attention might help reconcile why the literature finds that greater attention is associated with worse price efficiency in some situations (Barber and Odean, 2008) and is associated with better price efficiency in others (DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009; Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh, 2009 ).
Overall, our results show that uninformed ranking can work as a coordination mechanism to generate correlated trading. Ranking only matters when it affects investor attention. The correlated investor trading might lead to lower market quality.
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The findings of this paper have implications beyond the price limit setting. 6 Stocks and funds are often ranked by their ticker or name. Many rating systems in finance and out of finance assign discrete grades, and within-grade rankings might not be related to the quality we are looking for. Some examples are credit ratings, mutual fund ratings (e.g., Morningstar rating), student grades, and restaurant ratings. Very often, within-grade ranking is alphabetical that can lead to unfairness as in the academic publication setting that Einav and Yariv (2006) describe.
Relation to the Literature
Ranking
This paper contributes to the literature on the effect of ranking. Psychology has a long history of examining ranking. As an example, the rank-dependent utility (Quiggin, 1982) and the cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) predict that the ranking of payoffs impacts salience and people's decision weights. Scholars have studies the effect of alphabetical ranking. For example, Einav and Yariv (2006) document that authors with surnames early in the alphabet are more likely to receive tenure at top-economics departments. Feenberg, Ganguli, Gaule, and Gruber (2017) study weekly email announcement of NBER working papers and they document that papers listed first each week are more likely to be viewed, downloaded and subsequently cited. Jacobs and Hillert (2016) find that stocks that appear near the top of an alphabetical listing have higher trading volume and liquidity. Koppell and Steen (2004) find that candidates whose names are at the top of ballots receive more votes. Hartzmark (2015) shows that investors are more likely to sell the best-performing and worst-performing positions in their portfolios. In Hartzmark (2015), stock ranking is investor-specific, while in our setting, stock 6 rankings are shared by many investors.
The effect of ranking can come from a pure order effect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) or a relative magnitude effect (Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2012) . The pure order effect predicts that investors' attention allocation is only related to the order but not to the relative magnitudes, but Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2012) predict that the relative magnitude is the key driver for attention allocation. In the current paper, ranking is purely due to rounding, and the ranked stocks differ very little in terms of their ranked variable. This setting allows for a clean test and provides support for the existence of the pure order effect.
Investor Attention
This paper is also related to the growing literature on investor attention. Attention is necessary for learning and trading. On the one hand, investors try to allocate their limited attention optimally. On the other hand, they are affected by the salient attributes of options and attention allocation can lead to suboptimal choices because these might attract undo attention. The theoretical studies have examined how agents should rationally allocate attention (Sims, 2003) and how attention constraints affect investors' trading behavior and portfolio choice (Abel, Eberly, and Panageas, 2007; Huang and Liu, 2007; Van Niewerburgh and Veldkamp, 2010; Hendershott, Li, Menkveld, and Seasholes, 2014; Andrei and Hasler, 2016) , price informativeness (Peng, 2005) , return comovement (Peng and Xiong, 2006; Mondria, 2010), return volatility (Andrei and Hasler, 2015) , asset price levels (Merton, 1987; Barber and Odean, 2008; Andrei and Hasler, 2015) , and corporate policy (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003) .
The empirical literature on attention has proposed various proxies, such as extreme returns (Barber and Odean, 2008; Seasholes and Wu, 2007), trading volume (Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin, 2001; Barber and Odean, 2008; and Hou, Peng, and Xiong, 2009 ), news and headlines 7 (Huberman and Regev, 2001; Barber and Odean, 2008; Tetlock, 2011; Yuan, 2015; Kaniel and Parham, 2016) , advertising spending (Chemmanur and Yan, 2009; Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston, 2004; Lou, 2014; Madsen and Niessner, 2016) , Google Search Volume Index (Da, Engelberg, and Gao, 2011) , searching on Bloomberg terminals (Ben-Rephael, Da, and Israelsen, 2016) , retweeted
Twitter news (Chawla, Da, Xu, and Ye, 2015) , release of stale information (Huberman and Regev, 2001; Tetlock, 2011; Gilbert, Kogan, Lochstoer, and Ozyildirim, 2012) , and distraction by weekends or contemporaneous events (DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009; Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh, 2009; Louis and Sun, 2010; Huang, Huang and Lin, 2016; Kempf, Manconi, and Spalt, 2016; Peress and Schmidt, 2016) . Limited attention can explain many financial market phenomena such as overreaction and underreaction (Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh, 2009; Da, Engelberg, and Gao, 2011; Li and Yu, 2012) . Seasholes and Wu (2007) is an important precedent for using price limit events to measure investor attention. However, they compare upper price limit stocks with other stocks, while we compare across the stocks that hit the limit.
In this paper, we investigate the salience effect due to ranking. Relative to most studies, our empirical strategy can deal with the endogeneity concern for investor attention. 7 The attention difference across price limit stocks with small differences in returns is unlikely to be a deliberate decision by investors. In addition, most studies almost exclusively focus on how attention affects stock returns. There are a limited number of studies on how attention affects other important aspects of the financial markets such as trading volume, liquidity, volatility, and price efficiency.
The novel design of this paper allows for the investigation of all of these aspects and in a systematic 7 Liu and Peng (2016) document compelling evidence that investors take attention allocation into account when making decisions. Firms are also active in managing investor attention. Madsen and Niessner (2016) find that part of the previous findings on the financial market effect of advertisement might be due to the endogeneity of advertisement. Michaely, Rubin and Vedrashko (2016) highlight that firms that choose to make important announcements on Friday rather than other weekdays might be inherently different from other firms. Boulland and Dessaint (2014) show that firms strategically reduce investor attention when they plan to disclose bad news. 8 way.
Price Limit
The stock markets institute price limit rules as a stabilization mechanism to provide time for rational assessment during large price fluctuations. Critics point out that the price limit rules can cause higher volatility, impede price discovery, and interfere with trading (Kim and Rhee, 1997). Chen, Gao, He, Jiang, and Xiong (2016) show evidence that price manipulators take advantage of other investors during the price limit events. None of these studies examine the effect of price limits from the perspective of ranking. The findings in this paper provide one mechanism on why price limits might lead to higher volatility and lower price efficiency.
Institutional Background
The two Chinese stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) established the current price limit rule on December 16, 1996. 8 For most of the stocks ("normal" stocks), the daily absolute movement of a stock price is restricted to 10% of the previous trading day's closing price. On April 22, 1998, the SSE and SZSE started to label a group of stocks as "special treatment" stocks (or ST stocks). These stocks have a narrower daily price limit of ±5%. A stock is labelled as a ST stock if its accounting profits are negative for two consecutive years or if the net asset value per share is lower than the par value of the stock. For both normal and ST stocks, trading can continue to take place after its stock price hits the upper 9 (lower) price limit, but the trading price cannot be out of the range of the daily price limit. 9 As a result, a stock can hit the limit during a trading day but close the day within the limits.
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In both the SSE and SZSE, the minimum tick size for stocks is RMB 1 cent. Therefore, in cases where a ±10% (or ±5% in case of ST stocks) price change is not an integral number of cents, the exchanges round the daily price limit to the nearest cent. Consider the following example.
Suppose there are three stocks: A, B, and C. Their closing prices at the previous trading day are 9.99RMB, 10.00RMB, and 10.01RMB, respectively. Rounded to the nearest cent, their 10% price movement is 1.00RMB for all. Although they all have the same dollar value for the daily price movement, their return limits are different. Returns at the upper (lower) limits are 10.01% (-10.01%), 10.00% (-10.00%), and 9.99% (-9.99%), for A, B, and C, respectively.
As discussed in the Introduction, investors can easily access all the stocks that are ranked by their daily returns. In a descending rank, the 10.01% will be ranked first, 10.00% second, and 9.99% third. In the ascending rank, the -10.01% will be ranked the first, -10.00% second, and -9.99% third.
Stocks ranked at the beginning of a list are more salient than stocks ranked later in the list.
In the example in Figure 1 , if one could separate stocks at the 10% upper limit from other stocks, it would be easy to reverse the order and rank the 9.97% stocks first. However, none of the most widely used trading software packages provides such separate lists. The number of stocks on each page depends on the size and resolution of your computer screen. On a 20-inch screen with 1600x900 resolution, the first page shows around 30 stocks (like Figure 1) . With a smaller screen or lower resolution, the stocks with lower limit returns display on the second page. Ranking on the second page further reduces those stocks' salience.
Unlike other settings where rankings can be manipulated, we argue that firms are unlikely to manipulate the ranking we study. Corporate opportunistic activity might affect whether a stock hits its daily price limit or not, but this activity is unlikely to differ across the stocks at the limit but with different daily returns. To do this, a firm needs to manage its stock price deliberately to close at some specific number and make sure that the stock will hit the price limit the next trading day, which is a small probability event to begin with. 11 In addition, as we document later, the price effect is temporary, it is unclear how firms can benefit from it. Overall, we argue that the price limit events provide a quasi-random ranking.
Data and Summary Statistics
We restrict the sample to China's A-shares (i.e., shares that are quoted and traded in We compare across stocks that hit the same type of limit on the same day. We focus on stocks that hit the limit at market close and discard stocks that hit the limit during a day but not at the market close. We follow this procedure to ensure that investors have time to pay attention to the ranking. There is 18.5 hours from market close to the next day's market open. The intraday ranking might matter less because the list of stocks that hit the limit changes from time to time, and investors might pay attention to different intraday lists.
We denote stocks ranked in the first half of a list as the High group and stocks ranked in the second half as the Low group. Both the High and the Low group contain only stocks that hit one type of limit. We do this separately for each type of price limit events. For days with an odd number of stocks that hit the limit, the median stock is put into the High group. The results are similar if we put the median stocks into the Low group or we simply discard them. 13 To include a day into the analysis, we require that there are at least five such stocks in a day. In the sample period, there are 4,910 trading days. For the 10% upper limit stock analysis, the final sample contains 2,505 days and 54,706 stocks, with an average 21.8 stocks per day. For the -10% lower limit stock analysis, the final sample contains 522 days and 25,846 stocks, with an average of 49.5
stocks. The lower limit events are more concentrated than the upper limit events.
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There are days with a very large number of stocks that hit the limit. The day with the largest number of 10% upper limit events is September 19, 2008, with 1,234 stocks that hit the limit. On that day, the market index increased by 9.45%. The day with the largest number of -10% upper limit events is June 10, 2008, with 852 stocks that hit the limit. On that day, the market index decreased by 7.73%. Days like these are unusual. In total, 27 (55) days have more than 100 stocks that hit the 10% (-10%) limit. In the empirical analysis, we weight each event day equally rather than weight each event stock equally. Therefore, the results are not affected by these unusual days. On average, for 10% upper (-10% lower) limit events, there are 11.17 (25.03) stocks in the High group and 10.67 (24.48) stocks in the Low group. The High group has more stocks because we classify the median stocks into the High group for days with an odd number of stocks. Day t is the day of the price limit day. The means of Returnt are 10.032% (-10.016%) and 9.974% (-9.964%)
for High and Low, respectively. By construction, the high statistical significance is not surprising.
The differences for both the upper and the lower limit cases are only around five basis points that are economically small. We also report firm size (log market capitalization), log price, and raw price at t-1. None of the three variables shows any statistically or economically significant difference.
We also test whether the two groups differ in a few other characteristics. Turnover is the 13 daily trading volume scaled by the number of tradable shares. 14 We use relative bid-ask spread to measure liquidity and realized variance to measure return variation. We calculate both measures with intraday data. 15 Relative spread is defined as the bid-ask spread divided by the average of the bid and ask. The daily relative spread is averaged across all of the prevailing quotes for all of the trades within a day. Realized variance for stock i is defined in a "model-free" fashion as:
where denotes the logarithmic price (midpoint of bid and ask) of stock i at the end of the jth 10-minute interval in day t. This model-free realized volatility based on high-frequency intraday data is more accurate than the realized volatility based on daily returns (Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Labys, 2001a, 2001b) . It also provides a daily measure of volatility that can be used to compare return variations day by day around the price limit events.
We calculate all three variables for two periods: t-125 to t-21 and t-20 to t-1. We do the calculations for these two periods separately because t-20 to t-1 is shortly before the price limit events and might be different from t-125 to t-21. We want to make sure that the High and Low groups are not different in any of these two periods. For each variable, we first calculate its daily value and then calculate its time series mean. The results in Table 1 show that for both the High and Low groups, turnover and volatility in the t-20 to t-1 period are higher than in the t-125 to t-21 period, and relative spread keeps constant. The increase in turnover and volatility suggests that 14 Originally because the government did not want to lose control of the state-owned enterprises, most of the shares it owned were not allowed to trade in the public market. These non-tradable shares accounted for around two thirds of the total market capitalization. Starting in 2005, via the split share structure reform, most of these shares gradually became tradable. We measure turnover as trading volume divided by the number of tradable shares to reflect this feature. However, if we divide trading volume by total number of shares outstanding, the results are similar. 15 To avoid recording errors in the data, we apply filters similar to what are used by Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001) . Specifically, we delete quotes when the quoted spread is larger than 5RMB or when the quoted spread/transaction price is larger than 0.4. When we calculate the bid-ask spread, we also delete the quotes when the bid or the ask is at the limit price when the price limit rule prevents quotes from being on the other side. When calculating the realized variance, we keep the quotes when the bid or the ask is at the limit price. But instead of calculating the returns based on the midpoint price, we calculate the returns based on the limit price.
14 the stock trading in the month leading to the price limit events is different from normal periods.
However, the changes in these variables are similar for both the High and Low groups, and we do not find any significant difference between them in any of the three variables or in any period. To further compare the High group and the Low group, in later analysis, we also report these firm characteristics from t-5 to t-1 on a daily basis. We do not find any significant difference between the High group and the Low group in any of these five days. 16 Overall, these results confirm that the High group stocks and the Low group stocks are comparable to each other in the periods before they hit the 10% upper or the -10% lower price limit.
Empirical Results
Methodology
We compare the High and Low groups in the period after they hit the limit. We compare whether they are different in terms of average returns, trading volume, liquidity, and return volatility. We use the standard event study method to gauge any differences in both returns and other variables. For a given variable X, we do the following (separately for different price limit events):
(1) We first calculate the abnormal change in X (denoted as AbnX) for each price limit stock.
(2) For a given day, we calculate the average AbnX for the High and Low groups.
(3) We calculate the time series average of the daily mean AbnX from (2) and the difference between the High and Low groups. We also calculate the statistical significance for High-Low, based on the time series data.
16 Please see Table 2 to Table 5 for details.
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For all of these variables, we calculate and report the statistics for these window periods:
every day from t-5 to t+5, (t+6, t+10), (t+11, t+20), and (t+1, t+20). As the results will show, day t+1 is different. We therefore also report the statistics for (t+2, t+20).
In step (1), we adjust the variables differently. For returns, we calculate the abnormal return as the difference between the raw return and the contemporaneous value weighted size-decile portfolio return. 17 Size deciles are formed at the end of June for each year and rebalanced annually.
For investor attention, turnover, relative spread, and realized variance, we calculate their abnormal changes as the difference between the raw values to the average in the period from t-125 to t-21
by the following equation (2):
This adjustment controls for the cross-stock differences in the unconditional levels of these variables. We can interpret the statistics as percentage changes. In order to include a stock in the sample, we require that there are at least 60 data points in the t-125 to t-21 window.
Main Results:
Return, Volume, Liquidity, and Volatility Table 2 shows the results for the 10% upper limit stocks. The four panels report results on abnormal return, abnormal volume, abnormal spread, and abnormal volatility, respectively. Before hitting the limit, from t-5 to t-1, stocks in the High and Low groups show a positive abnormal return, positive abnormal volume, negative abnormal bid-ask spread, and positive abnormal volatility. However, the differences between the High and the Low groups are miniscule and are only occasionally statistically significant at the 10% level (once in the abnormal volume on day t- 17 Our results are similar if we examine raw returns.
The 10% Upper Limit Stocks
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1 and once in the abnormal spread on day t-5). We also conduct a test (un-tabulated) for the differences between the High and Low groups for the cumulative returns, average abnormal volume, average abnormal spread, and average abnormal volatility from t-5 to t-1 and find no statistical significance. On day t, the High and Low groups all hit the 10% limit. Relative to the day t raw returns we see in Table 1 , the size-decile adjusted returns are smaller, suggesting that the contemporaneous market returns are positive for days when there are at least five stocks that hit the 10% limit. The differences in day t abnormal returns are similar to the unadjusted return as shown in Table 1 and are economically small. There are no significant differences in the other three variables on day t.
Stocks in the two groups start to show significant differences after they hit the limit. On day t+1, the High-Low return is 0.381% (t=6.65), which is both statistically and economically significant. This is much larger than the High-Low return on day t -the direct effect of rounding.
From t+2, High-Low becomes negative and is statistically so for t+5 and also over the period from t+6 to t+10. From t+2 to t+10, the High group's cumulative abnormal return is -0.380% lower than the Low group. This difference fully offsets the initial positive difference on day t. The High group decreases by another 0.088% relative to the Low group from t+11 to t+20. In aggregate, from t+1 to t+20, the difference in cumulative returns between the High and Low groups is only -0.087% (t=-0.44), which is statistically insignificant and economically small.
Trading volume and return volatility increase more for the High group than the Low group.
On day t+1, the differences are both around 20%, which is economically large. The differences diminish but persist at least for 20 trading days. The High groups' bid-ask spread decreases relatively more than the Low group's. The difference in liquidity change is statistically significant for day t+1, t+3, and t+4 but not afterwards. The economic magnitude is also small: High-Low is 17 only -0.8% of its level in a normal period. Table 2 , namely, that the High group starts to show significant differences after they hit the limit and the differences largely reverse in two to three weeks. The results on abnormal spread are the weakest. Even for abnormal spread, the differences between the High and Low groups are negative for most of the days after the stocks hit the limit.
5.2.2
The -10% Lower Limit Stocks Table 3 shows the results for the -10% upper limit stocks. Like the 10% limit stocks, there are no significant differences between the High and Low groups in terms of returns, volume, spread or volatility before stocks hit the -10% limit. On day t, the High group's price decreases by 0.077% more than the Low group. Again, this is similar to the difference in their raw returns in Table 1 .
There are no significant differences in any of the other three variables on day t. Stocks in the two groups do not behave differently in the period after they hit the -10% limit.
An Attention-Based Interpretation
We propose an attention-based interpretation of the above results. We argue that, for the 18 10% limit stocks, stocks ranked higher attract more investor attention. The prices for these stocks are more likely to continue to increase and thus many investors crowd to buy them. Higher attention leads to more crowded buying, which leads to higher trading, higher volatility, and shortterm price overreaction. Because attention-driven trading is not informed, it leads to better liquidity.
The asymmetry between buying and selling can explain the asymmetry between the two types of limit events. Stocks that hit the upper (lower) price limit are more likely to attract buyers (sellers). Ranking higher among the 10% limit stocks attracts greater attention from buyers. While sellers are more likely to pay attention to their holdings than the ranking of all other stocks, the number of stocks they hold is typically small. Limited attention has a smaller effect on selling decisions than buying decisions.
Next, we provide four tests to support the above discussed attention-based mechanism.
The ±5% Limit Stocks
We expect that the effect of ranking is weaker or nonexistent on the ST stocks. The daily limit for ST stocks is ±5%. Typically, the ±5% returns are not extreme enough to be ranked at the top of either the best-performing stock list or the worst-performing stock list. While ±5% are still large returns and can attract more than average attention, a 5.01% stock is unlikely to attract significantly greater attention than a 4.99% stock. Therefore, stocks ranked differently in the 5% limit list or in the -5% list should not behave significantly different. Table 4 and Table 5 confirm the above conjectures. Table 4 reports the results for the 5% upper price limit stocks and Table 5 reports the results for the -5% lower price limit stocks. To analyze the ±5% limit stocks, we use the same methodology as for the ±10% limit stocks. Table   4 and Table 5 show that the High and Low groups only differ in terms of returns on day t. This is mechanical because stocks are sorted based on their day t's returns. Other than this, there is no 19 clear difference in any of the four characteristics that we investigate, either in the period before they hit the limit or in the period after they hit the limit.
Investor Attention
Using a direct measure of attention, we examine how ranking affects investors and how the ranking-attention relation varies across different price limit events. Table 6 reports the results. The four types of price limit events are analyzed separately and reported in the four panels. We also use the same methodology as for abnormal volume, abnormal spread and abnormal volatility. For each stock on any event day, we first calculate the abnormal level of attention by equation (2) and then aggregate the abnormal attention across stocks in that group. The statistics in Table 6 are calculated based on the time series data. Table 6 shows that there is no significant difference in investor attention before the stocks 18 Relative to Google Trends, there is no ambiguity on identifying stocks. It is also reasonable to assume that all views are for trading purposes. In addition, the coverage of hexun.com is much better than Google Trends that does not return valid data for many stocks in the sample. Google was never the biggest search engine in China, even before it exited China in 2010.
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hit the limit for any of the four types of price limit events. From day t, for the 10% upper limit stocks, the High group starts to attract significantly greater attention than the Low group. The difference is statistically significant from t to t+3. It is still positive but not statistically significant afterwards. The difference is the greatest for t+1, and it is economically large. On day t+1 the High group's attention is 5.743 times greater than their normal time average, and the Low group's attention is 4.930 times greater than their normal time average. The difference is almost the same as the average attention they attract in a normal day. The investor attention does not show significant differences between the High and the Low groups for the other three types of price limit events, although we do see statistical significance occasionally.
For the 10% limit stocks, the timing of the attention changes matches well with the timing of the changes in other variables, but not perfectly. The High-Low attention difference is the greatest at t+1 and then diminishes in a few days. It is still positive after day t+4 but not statistically significant. Returns, volume, spread, and volatility all show the largest difference between the High and the Low groups on day t+1 when the attention difference is greatest. Similar to the effect on attention, the effect on spread is also temporary. But the effect on volume and volatility is more persistent. One possible reason is that it takes time for investors to rebalance their portfolios.
Investor attention on the High and Low stocks starts to differ on day t, while returns, volume, liquidity, and volatility do not show significant differences on that day. We conjecture that this is because the investor attention is measured from midnight to midnight and the attention measured on day t reflects its level after market close. The ranking is available after market close.
Hence we do predict that attention should differ between the High and Low groups after market close on day t.
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These findings are consistent with the findings in Table 2 to Table 5 . We only find significant differences in return, volume, liquidity, and volatility between the High and Low groups when we see a significant difference in investor attention. These findings also confirm the previous conjectures: ranking matters more for buying than selling (the asymmetry between the 10% cases and the -10% cases); ranking has little effect when it has no effect on attention (the ±5% cases).
Length of the Ranking
In this subsection, we investigate how the effect of ranking depends on the length of the list of stocks hitting the 10% limit. 20 We conjecture that ranking matters less when the list is short and more when the list is long: Attention may not be limited if there are only a few limit hitting stocks, but more likely to be so if the list is long. We test this in a regression framework. 
where , +1 is the abnormal change in variable X for stock i on day t+1. We focus on day t+1
because we see the strongest effects of ranking on that day. We analyze five different variables:
investor attention, return, volume, liquidity, and volatility. is the day fixed effects. Adding day fixed effects allows us to investigate the heterogeneities across stocks in the same day. , is the percentile rank of stock i's limit hitting return on day t. Stocks with higher returns have higher Rank values. ≤10 , 10< ≤20 , 20< ≤40 , and >40 are four dummy variables that indicate Low return difference on day t+1 should mainly come from the overnight period. In un-tabulated results, we find that the High-Low return from market close on day t to market open on day t+1 is 0.285% (t=8.03) and from market open on day t+1 to market close on day t+1 is 0.111% (t=2.26). 20 From Table 2 to 6, we only find a significant difference between the High and Low groups for the 10% price limit stocks. We therefore conduct analyses only for the 10% price limit stocks. The analyses for the other three types of price limit events are available upon request. In a nutshell, we do not find any significant difference in terms of the moderating effect of the length of the list, attention-driven trading, or price efficiency between the High and Low groups for the other three types of price limit events.
22 days when the number of limit stocks ( ) is within a specified range. 10, 20, and 40 are roughly the 33 rd , the 66 th , and the 90 th percentiles across the number of stocks for all of the event days.
Rank and the four dummies are not included in the regression because Rank is a linear combination of the four interaction terms, and the four dummies are subsumed by the day fixed effects.
, −1 is the natural logarithm of firm i's market capitalization one day before it hits the limit.
21
The results in Table 7 show that the effect of ranking is indeed larger when more stocks hit the limit. The pattern is clear for all the five characteristics except for abnormal spread where the results are the weakest to begin with. The results also show that the effect of ranking mainly depends on whether the number of limit stocks is more than ten or not. The effect is much weaker when N≤10 and the differences between 10<N≤20, 10<N≤20, and N>40 are small. This is consistent with the evidence from the psychology literature that finds that working memory allows people to handle roughly "seven plus or minus two" items at the same time (Miller, 1956 ).
Attention-Driven Trading
Different investors react differently to attention-grabbing events (Barber and Odean, 2008).
As we do not directly observe investors' trading, we infer it from the imbalances in trades of different sizes. Similar method has been adopted for both the United States and China (Lee and Radhakrishna, 2000; Hvidkjaer, 2008; Barber, Odean, and Zhu, 2009; Liao, Liu, and Wang, 2011) .
Following these studies, we use trade size to represent the investor sophistication. We expect that the High group should attract more small buy orders than the Low group.
We sort all trades into three groups: small trades are the trades with values equal to or lower than 20,000RMB, medium trades are the trades with values equal to or lower than 100,000RMB but larger than 20,000RMB, and large trades are larger than 100,000RMB. 20,000RMB is roughly the median trade size of for all trades across all stocks, and 100,000RMB is roughly the 83 rd percentile.
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We measure trade imbalance as the value of buyer-initiated trades minus the value of sellerinitiated trades divided by the total value of trades. We calculate its abnormal level as 23 : suggesting that leading up to a price limit event, investors do not show different preferences between the High and Low groups. On t+1, the difference in order imbalance between the High and Low groups is significantly positive for both small trades and medium trades, but not for large trades. The small trades' imbalance is larger than the medium trades' imbalance and the small trades' imbalance is also positive on day t+2. This is consistent with the conjecture that smaller investors are more likely to be affected by attention, and large investors are insensitive to attention.
Interestingly, large trade investors start to sell more of the High group. Large trade investors continue to be net sellers for t+3 and t+4. This suggests that large trade investors trade against the short-term mispricing induced by the attention difference. From t+5 to t+20, we do not see any 22 The choice of cutoffs is inherently arbitrary. Therefore we also check the results by changing the cutoffs. The results are robust if we set the maximum cutoff for the small trade size from 20,000RMB to 10,00RMB, 30,000RMB, 40,000RMB, or 50,000RMB, or if we set the maximum cutoff for the medium trade size from 100,000RMB to 200,000RMB or 500,000RMB. 23 We do not divide it by its unconditional mean as we do for trading volume, liquidity, and volatility because for many stocks, the unconditional mean of order imbalance in the period between t-125 and t-21is negative or near to zero. Our results are similar without adjusting for the historical average order imbalance.
24 statistically significant differences between the High and Low groups for any of the three trade groups.
Price Efficiency
In Table 9 , we examine whether ranking affects price efficiency. Attention is necessary for investors to learn. Rational learning can enhance price discovery. Attention is also affected by salient attributes such as the ranking in this setting. Attention-driven by ranking is unlikely to be a deliberate decision. Attention-driven crowded trading can lead to lower price efficiency, if the attention grabbing events mainly attract noise traders (Barber and Odean, 2008).
We measure price efficiency by using variance ratio. We follow the methodology in O'Hara and Ye (2011) and use intraday data to compute the variance ratio as the absolute value of one minus the variance of 10-minute log returns divided by two times the variance of 5-minute log returns. To mitigate the effect of the bid-ask bounce, returns are calculated based on the midpoint.
A ratio of zero is consistent with stocks following a random walk. Hence, a smaller number is better in terms of price efficiency (Lo and MacKinlay, 1988) . Similar to the other variables, we also adjust the calculation of the abnormal level variance ratio based on equation (2).
The abnormal variance ratio for the High group at t-5 is -0.008, which means that its variance ratio is 99.2% of its normal time average. We find that from t-5 to t, the variance ratio is close to normal times for both the High and Low groups. The High group's abnormal variance ratio is significantly higher than that of the Low group for both day t+1 and t+2, but is insignificant for other days. These results indicate that the price efficiency of the High group decreases more than the Low group, but the relative decrease is a short-term phenomenon.
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Robustness
A Placebo Test
An important identification assumption is that stocks in the High group are not systematically different from stocks in the Low groups. Based on the empirical design, it is unlikely that they are systematically different. Nevertheless, we conduct a placebo test to provide further evidence.
Between May 21, 1992, and December 15, 1996 (both inclusive), there was no limit on the daily movement of a stock price. We construct hypothetical 10% price limit events based on stocks' daily prices and returns for this period by applying the price limit rule that is only effective after this period. We then conduct an analysis by comparing hypothetical High and hypothetical Low.
The strategy is best illustrated in an example. Consider two stocks: X and Y. The X's previous closing price is 9.99RMB, and Y's is 10.01RMB. Suppose that both of them receive positive public news that increases their equity value by R% where R>10. By applying the 10% price limit rule, their price should increase by 1.00RMB, leading to 10.01% return for X and 9.99% return for Y.
In this case, X is ranked higher than Y. Therefore, X would be the hypothetical High and Y would be hypothetical Low.
The true ranking (without the price limit rule) can be very different from the above hypothetical ranking. Without the price limit rule, the ranking depends on the value of R. A small change in R can change the relative ranking between X and Y. For example, when R=12, X (12.02%) will be ranked higher than Y (11.99%); when R=11.95, the ranking will reverse (11.91%
for X and 11.99% for Y).
If ranking causes the differences, then we expect that stocks in the hypothetical High and the Low groups will behave similarly-their true ranking is not much related to the hypothetical 26 ranking. If there are some inherent differences between X and Y, then we should expect the hypothetical price limit events to deliver similar findings as the real price limit events in the postDecember 16, 1996 period.
In total, we have 212 days with at least five hypothetical 10% upper price limit events, and in total, we have 5,924 such stocks. The true returns for the hypothetical High and Low groups are 15.571% and 15.720%. Not surprisingly, both are well above 10%. The difference is not statistically significant. In this period, we do not have intraday data or the attention data from hexun.com. We thus focus on returns (adjusted by size-decile portfolios) and volumes (adjusted as in equation (2)). Table 10 reports the results. We do not find any significant difference between the hypothetical High group and the hypothetical Low group. 24 This finding suggests that ranking is necessary to generate different stock behaviors.
Excluding Low Priced Stocks
Low priced stocks have larger microstructure noises. We investigate whether the results are sensitive to the exclusion of stocks priced lower than 5RMB. In Table 11 , we redo the analysis after excluding stocks priced lower than 5RMB. The 5RMB requirement reduces the number of eligible event days from 2,505 to 2,411. The total number of price limit events decreases from 54,706 to 46,785. 25 Like the, we find results similar to those of the whole sample analysis, which suggests that the results are not sensitive to inclusion of the low-priced stocks. 24 At the event day, the size-decile portfolio adjusted returns for the High and Low groups are 9.800% and 9.601%, respectively. The adjustment leads to a 6% decrease in returns. This is mainly because in this sample period, the number of firms was small and return synchronicity is also higher. The period from 1992-1996 was the very early stage of China's stock market. The number of listed firms in May 1992 was 28 and increased to 513 by the end of December 1996. In unreported results, I find qualitatively similar results for raw returns. Results are also similar if I "re-allocate" returns following the price limit rule. For example, if a stock had a return of 15% and its hypothetical daily return is 10.01%, I "move" 4.99% into the next trading day. 25 Some stocks priced higher than 5RMB are excluded if the exclusion of 5RMB reduces an event day's total number of price limit stocks to less than 5.
Excluding Consecutive Limit Hitting Stocks
Among the day t 10% price limit stocks, around 13% of them also hit the limit on day t-1. 26 Consecutive limit hitting stocks may attract very different investor attention than other stocks.
We therefore investigate whether the results are sensitive to the exclusion of these consecutive limit hitting stocks. The results from Table 12 are very similar to those in Table 2 . If anything, excluding these stocks seems to strengthen the results slightly.
Conclusion
Ranking is an important part of our daily life. In this paper, we exploit a novel natural experiment in which ranking is driven purely by the rounding of stock prices. We find that uninformed ranking can cause correlated investor trading and have a significant effect on the stock price, trading volume, liquidity, return volatility, and the price efficiency. Ranking does not have effects if it does not generate a significant difference in attention. Ranking has stronger effects when the length of the ranking is longer.
The effect of ranking can come from a pure order effect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) or a relative magnitude effect (Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2012) . In our setting, the stocks differ very little in terms of the ranking variable. The findings thus support the pure order effect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) .
It is interesting to investigate how ranking affects investors in other settings. First, how will the effect of ranking vary with respect to asset classes? The prices of stocks are noisy and their valuations are subjective. These characteristics leave room for uninformed demand. Will the effect of ranking be weaker for assets that are not as speculative (e.g., Treasury securities)? Second, how 26 The frequency of consecutive limit hitting stocks does not differ between the High and Low groups.
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will the effect of ranking vary with respect to the displayed information? For this setting, the returns and prices are displayed. What if the displayed information is about firm fundamental such as earnings? We leave these questions for future studies. , where denotes the logarithmic price of stock i at the end of the jth 10-minute interval in day t. We scale both turnover and realized variance by 100. The sample period is from December 16, 1996 , to March 31, 2015 , where denotes the logarithmic price of stock i at the end of the jth 10-minute interval in day t. For each variable, we first calculate the mean for High and Low separately at each day and also their difference, High-Low. We then calculate the time series means and t-values. For return and turnover, the sample period is from December 16, 1996 , to March 31, 2015 Table 3 .
-10% Lower Limit Stocks
This table reports the analysis on the -10% limit stocks. For each day with at least five price limit stocks, we rank them based on their absolute daily returns. The High group includes the ones in the first half of the list (with higher absolute returns) and the Low group includes all others. Abnormal return is the difference between the raw return and the size decile portfolio return. Abnormal turnover, abnormal spread, and abnormal volatility are calculated as the percentage change between the raw values and the average in the period between t-125 to t-21. Turnover is defined as daily shares traded divided by a stock's number of tradable shares. Spread is defined as bid-ask spread divided by the midpoint. Variance is defined as RV ≝
, where denotes the logarithmic price of stock i at the end of the jth 10-minute interval in day t. For each variable, we first calculate the mean for High and Low separately at each day and also their difference, High-Low. We then calculate the time series means and t-values. For return and turnover, the sample period is from December 16, 1996 , to March 31, 2015 This table reports the analysis on the 5% limit stocks. For each day with at least five price limit stocks, we rank them based on their absolute daily returns. The High group includes the ones in the first half of the list (with higher absolute returns) and the Low group includes all others. Abnormal return is the difference between the raw return and the size decile portfolio return. Abnormal turnover, abnormal spread, and abnormal volatility are calculated as the percentage change between the raw values and the average in the period between t-125 to t-21. Turnover is defined as daily shares traded divided by a stock's number of tradable shares. Spread is defined as bid-ask spread divided by the midpoint. Variance is defined as RV ≝
, where denotes the logarithmic price of stock i at the end of the jth 10-minute interval in day t. For each variable, we first calculate the mean for High and Low separately at each day and also their difference, High-Low. We then calculate the time series means and t-values. For return and turnover, the sample period is from April 22, 1998 , to March 31, 2015 , where denotes the logarithmic price of stock i at the end of the jth 10-minute interval in day t. For each variable, we first calculate the mean for High and Low separately at each day and also their difference, High-Low. We then calculate the time series means and t-values. For return and turnover, the sample period is from April 22, 1998 , to March 31, 2015 , is the percentile rank of stock i's limit hitting return on day t. Stocks with higher returns have higher Rank values.
≤10 , 10< ≤20 , 20< ≤40 , and >40 are four dummy variables indicating days when the number of limit hitting stocks ( ) is within a specified range.
, −1 is the natural logarithm of firm i's market capitalization one day before it hits the limit. We analyze five different variables: investor attention, return, volume, liquidity, and volatility. Abnormal return is return adjusted by size-decile portfolios. Abnormal attention, abnormal turnover, abnormal turnover, abnormal spread, and abnormal volatility are calculated as the percentage change between the raw values and the average in the period between t-125 to t-21. Attention is the number of viewers from hexun.com. Turnover is defined as the daily shares traded divided by a stock's number of tradable shares. Spread is defined as the bid-ask spread divided by the midpoint. Variance is defined as
, where denotes the logarithmic price of stock i at the end of the jth 10-minute interval in day t. For attention, the sample period is from This table reports the analysis on price efficiency for the 10% limit stocks. For each day with at least five price limit stocks, we rank them based on their absolute daily returns. The High group includes the ones in the first half of the list (with higher absolute returns) and the Low group includes others. We measure price efficiency by variance ratio. Variance ratio is defined as the absolute value of one minus the variance of 10-minute log returns divided by two times the variance of 5-minute log returns. Log returns are calculated based on the midpoint of the bid and ask. Abnormal variance ratio is calculated as the percentage change in the variance ratio relative to a stock's average variance ratio from t-125 to t-21. For abnormal variance ratio, we first calculate the mean for High and Low separately at each day and also their difference, High-Low, and then calculate the time series means and the t-values for High-Low. The sample period is from January 21, 1992, and December 15, 1996 (both inclusive), there was no limit for daily stock returns. We construct hypothetical price limit events based on the real returns of stocks by applying the price limit rule that is only effective after this period. We repeat the same analysis as we do for the real price limit events to these hypothetical price limit events. For the construction of the hypothetical limit, please see subsection 5.5.1. For the definition of High and Low, abnormal returns and abnormal turnover, please see Table 2 . Due to the unavailability of the attention data from hexun.com and the unavailability of intraday data in this sample period, we focus on returns and turnover. Panel A reports the results on returns (size-decile adjusted) and Panel B reports the results on turnover (adjusted based on equation (2) 
Figure 1. Illustration of a Stock Ranking
This figure is a screenshot from a popular trading software package. Stocks are sorted based on their daily returns, as indicated by the red arrow. The translations of the column titles are shown above the screenshot. On the software page, there are other data columns such as total volume, intraday high, intraday low, previous close price, firm industry, and firm location, shown to the left of the few items in Figure 1 . For the sake of space, we do not show them on the screenshot.
Figure 2. 10% Upper Limit Stocks
This figure plots the differences between the High and Low groups for the 10% upper limit stocks, from t-5 to t+20 where t is the day the stocks hit the limit. The four panels report results on the cumulative abnormal returns (cumulative from t-5), abnormal volume, abnormal spread, and abnormal volatility, respectively. The solid lines are the means and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals. In Panel A, we also plot the cumulative abnormal returns from t to t+20 (the dashed line). The x-axis is the event day: day 0 is the day the stocks hit the 10% limit. Abnormal returns are the raw returns adjusted by sizedecile portfolio returns. Abnormal turnover, abnormal spread, and abnormal volatility are calculated as percentage change relative to the average in the period from t-125 to t-21, following equation (2) 
